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Abstract—A System of Systems (SoS) is a term used to describe
independent systems converging for a purpose that could only
be carried out through this interdependent collaboration. Many
examples of SoSs exist, but the term has become a source
of confusion across domains. Moreover, there are few illustra-
tive SoS examples demonstrating their initial classification and
structure. While there are many approaches for engineering of
systems, less exist for SoS engineering. More specifically, there
is a research gap towards approaches addressing SoS security
risk assessment for engineering and operational needs, with a
need for tool-support to assist modelling and visualising security
risk and requirements in an interconnected SoS. From this,
security requirements can provide a systematic means to identify
constraints and related risks of the SoS, mitigated by human-
user and system requirements. This work investigates specific
challenges and current approaches for SoS security and risk,
and aims to identify the alignment of SoS factors and concepts
suitable for eliciting, analysing, validating risks with use of a
tool-support for assessing security risk in the SoS context.
Index Terms—System of Systems, Security, Risk, Requirements
Engineering, System of Systems Engineering.
I. PROJECT MOTIVATION AND SCOPE
Independent systems may at times need to come together
to achieve a greater or combined purpose in a collaborative
nature. For example, an emergency response unit may need
to manage and interoperate with the police, fire, ambulance,
or other critical services. Each of these may be considered an
independent system with its own purpose, people, processes
and technology, yet when collaborating with the emergency
response unit, this is to meet emergency response mission
objectives. This example of systems coming together for a
greater interaction collaborating with the emergency response
unit can be described as being a System of Systems (SoS).
Other examples of SoS may be less or more complex, or
have differing levels of management, control, and constraints
affecting the SoS as a whole; greater than that of a single
system, of which may also be different or conflicting at times.
Accounting for SoS security risk is dependent upon what
or whose view is being assessed within the SoS. Security risk
in SoSs is challenged by differing goals, trust boundaries and
levels of assurance, potentially leading to conflicting human
and system requirements across the interconnected SoS. Mo-
reover, each entity may only know or have access to varying
levels of information about other systems in which to assess
and model security risk at the SoS level. In some scenarios, a
SoS may have limited or no central management, or a weak
collaboration with minimal or no useful information to support
security risk assessments, presenting further obstacles towards
the elicitation of suitable security requirements addressing
security needs and concerns within the independent systems
and the SoS as a whole.
Broad research discussing SoSs exists, but lacks in suitable
case-studies to support the topic of security risk assessment
in SoSs. Furthermore, there is very little that demonstrates
modelling and visualisation of security risks, people, process
and technology for SoSs and requirements engineering. Cur-
rent tools appear to be designed with a single system or
organisation in mind, thus scaling-up to a SoS, sometimes
of which can be quite complex requiring many designs, is
a challenge. Identifying suitable combinations of tools and
techniques appropriate for modelling and visualising these
SoS interactions would therefore be useful to assist the SoS
security risk assessment and requirements engineering process.
The scope of this research project will therefore apply focus
towards security risk assessment in SoSs from the operational
view transitioning to systems and SoS security requirements
engineering considerations to further model, assess and mi-
tigate against risk. This will use research and case-studies
to explore suitable repeatable methods and approaches for
a security risk assessment in SoSs, using a tool-supported
framework to assist with risk-based decision making.
Research questions in Section II provided structure for
identifying challenges associated with assessing and modelling
security risk and requirements in a SoS, and continues to be
applied using methods described in Section III. A summary
of related research is discussed in Section IV providing
a foundation for identifying current approaches that frame
SoSs, and their challenges, human factors, security risk and
modelling approaches. An overview of project contributions
is summarised in Section V discussing related work towards
research questions [1][2][3], followed by a summary and next
steps in Section VI.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
When considering preliminary research, there appear to
be gaps between SoSs frameworks or industry approaches
towards how security risk may be modelled, visualised and
assessed within a SoS context. To address this research gap,
research questions (RQs) focus on three core areas of consi-
deration for SoS security risk and requirements:
RQ1 What SoSs factors contribute to challenges of security
risk assessment of SoSs?
RQ2 What concepts are suitable to support a framework for
security risk assessment with requirements elicitation in
SoSs?
RQ3 How can the SoS security risk assessment framework be
extended using modelling and visualisation software tools
to assist the SoS security risk and requirements process?
III. RESEARCH METHODS
To address research questions, a qualitative approach is
taken combining inductive and deductive methods with action
research, e.g. with the creation and refinement of the approach
with case-studies to investigate and identify SoS challenges
for security risk and requirements. Using Grounded theory
to systematically analyse data will further assist research and
case-studies forming a theory from its output, supported by
literature reviews, interviews or focus groups with relevant
stakeholders to ground the theory based on the empirical study.
Prototyping will be used in differing scenarios to address RQ2
and RQ3, for example, where SoS elements are implemented
into a suitable risk assessment process, then modified and
tested with tool-support. Elements of interpretive design are
to be explored within this part agenda-driven research, where
general scope for future work is identified, taking a model-
driven approach towards security risk and requirements en-
gineering. SoS case-studies and exemplars are, however, a
central focus for RQ’s to help test, validate and formalise the
framework blending a component-driven and system-driven
risk assessment approach, using tool-support to model and
assess SoS security risk and requirements.
IV. RELATED WORK
A. Risk in Security
Risk in a security context can be defined as the effect
of uncertainty on objectives [4]. Describing security risk
can be synonymous with information technology related risk,
considering the probability and impact of a threat-source
intentionally or accidentally exploiting a system or information
asset vulnerability [5]. The combination of the probability and
impact equates to the level of risk present. Security is about the
protection of assets from threats and vulnerabilities, applying
security controls to reduce or mitigate risk [6]. We can define
an Asset as anything that has value to the organisation; A
Threat as a potential for a threat-source to accidentally trigger
or intentionally exploit a specific vulnerability; and a Vulne-
rability as a weakness in system security procedures, design,
implementation, or internal controls that could result in a
security breach or a violation [4][7]. Threat impact may derive
from unauthorised disclosure, modification, or destruction of
information, failure to exercise due care and diligence in the
implementation and operation, unintentional errors, omissions,
or disruptions due to natural or man-made disasters [5].
Information Security processes, controls and methodologies
protect print, electronic, or any other form of confidential,
private and sensitive information or data [8]. These should also
consider needs of training and awareness, physical security,
due diligence on third parties and contractual management,
and data privacy requirements [9]. Documenting risk should be
written in business-friendly language rather than endless detail
of overly complex technical jargon, and be presented under
high-level headings noting potential impacts on operations
[10]. A range of risk approaches may be used, although in the
current context, it is expected that risk assessment should at
the very least use modelling, and be repeatable, measureable,
and auditable [11]. A number of differing methods for security
risk management exist, e.g. [4][12], covering a wide range of
security techniques, controls and considerations towards secu-
rity protection. The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) methodology is another
that stands out, offering three approaches requiring differing
levels of skill and application. The OCTAVE Allegro iteration
is suitable for assessing Information Security risk, reducing
the need for participatory workshops from all organisational
and levels, whilst producing more robust results without the
need for extensive risk assessment knowledge [13].
B. System of Systems and Systems Risk
Before exploring where SoS security risk assessment is
challenged, it is useful to consider how the term System of
Systems applies, and the context in which System is used, e.g.
the coming together of people, process, software and hardware,
integrated to achieve a purpose. Systems are composed of
parts or elements with relationships between other elements
of the system [14]. However, the arrangement of the whole
must be understood to appreciate how the system is formed
[15]. Some may also be regarded as socio-technical systems
- organisational systems that include people, processes and
technological systems, where intrinsic complexity arises from
the multi-dimensional interactions [16] of which creates gre-
ater challenges when scaled-up into a SoS environment.
Historically, SoSs are considered to be large-scale concur-
rent and distributed systems, comprised of complex systems
with autonomy [17][18], yet equally a SoS is a system that
contains two or more independently managed elements [14],
regardless of scale. The SoS concept may therefore mean diffe-
rent things to different people. In an organisational context, the
SoS is the enterprise-wide sharing of core business information
across functional and geographical areas. Whereas, military
and defence SoSs can be configurable sets of constituent-
systems in dynamic communication infrastructures [19]. A
SoS could therefore be described as consisting of multiple, he-
terogeneous, operationally, distributed, occasionally indepen-
dently, operating systems embedded in networks at multiple
levels that evolve over time [20]. The coming together provides
a set of systems for a task that none of the systems can
accomplish on their own. However, each constituent system
keeps its own management, goals, and resources while co-
ordinating within the SoS and adapting to meet SoS goals [21].
SoS examples include smart devices to smart cities, and many
Internet of Things (IoT) systems, general business information
systems, sensor networks emergency response units, defence
and national security, and many more [1][2][22]. Aligning with
other research of SoSs, we can simply define a System of
Systems as being ‘the coming together of independent systems
collaborating for a new or higher purpose’ [3]. Within the
limited range of SoS-based engineering guides and literature,
many reproduce SoS descriptions and definitions largely foun-
ded and supported by Maier [23] along with Dahmann and
Baldwin [24], bringing together the main four summarised
categories of SoSs.
- Directed SoSs possess central management, operation and
control over the SoS as a whole;
- Acknowledged SoSs have designated management, but
limited control over the SoS as a whole;
- Collaborative SoSs have no central management, so ope-
ration and control is formed and agreed as a mutual
independent collaboration;
- Virtual SoSs have individual independent collaboration
with no central management, operation or control of the
SoS as a whole.
While SoSs generally fall into one of these categories, the
distinction is not always clear. In some scenarios, a system
within the SoS may also be considered as a type of SoS within
its own operational environment. These SoSs are often compo-
sed of independent systems and sub-systems, coming together
in ways elements may not have originally been designed for.
Emergence can be described as relating to the formation of
new behaviours due to development or evolutionary processes
and coming together [17]. Emergent behaviour is, therefore,
often unplanned and evolves through the interactions and
collaborations that naturally develop within the SoS [23].
Interoperability can be described as the ability of two or
more systems or elements to use and exchange information,
thus being an important element of a SoS successful system
integration [25]. However, human factors within the complex
interaction between systems of the SoS requires attention, as
compatible technology alone may not achieve interoperability
[26]. Success can only be achieved if the stakeholder engage-
ment is conducted correctly with all relevant stakeholders [27]
throughout the SoS life-cycle.
SoSs risks and mitigations focus on desired capabilities
and undesirable emergent behaviours of the SoS, and other
security-related aspects along the communication channels
between systems and the external world [28]. SoS capability
security may be impacted by operational use or change over
time, or from system-level changes to meet individual needs of
constituent system stakeholders, changing risk equations that
might go unidentified [29]. Security must be designed into the
systems with a concious aspect towards how it is operated [30].
Applying security to systems in isolation may lead to incorrect
areas of focus for effective security, potentially consuming
needed resources [31], and can lead to unidentified areas
of threat [9]. Other security risk may arise from within the
supply chain, thus requiring further consideration as the SoS
attack surface grows, therefore software supply chain risks
and assurance of security must begin to be addressed during
acquisition of the development life-cycle [32].
Trust and assurance are important factors for the design and
operation of a secure socio-technical system. These factors
and their inter-dependencies, with intrinsic and contextual
trust warranting properties should be considered at the human
level as well as the technical [33]. Trust is the willingness
to be vulnerable, based on the positive expectations about
the actions of others [34], and it is an individual’s reliance
on another party under conditions of dependence and risk
[35]. Whereas, trustworthiness is defined from the trustor
and trustee perspectives as an objective quality governing the
degree to which transactional obligations will be fulfilled in
situations characterised by risk or uncertainty [36]. Moreover,
trustworthiness of the flow of information, the security of
the service provision, and the protection of the supporting
systems of the SoS need to be taken into account [37].
Capturing the criticality of independent system requirements
that accurately reflect users’ needs is crucial to the success
of engineering and its role in the system development process
[38][39]. Difficulty may increase with complexity of multiple
independently managed systems and requirements that need to
be co-ordinated in order to achieve the SoS objectives [17].
C. SoS and Requirements Engineering
For SoSs, the bridge between operations and requirements
engineering is essential to reduce security risk against mission
outcomes. Security risk assessment is applied at the operatio-
nal level, carried through to the development life-cycle, where
security requirements should begin with asset analysis and the
context in which they are in [40] and continue to focus on
related human factors and interoperability critical for the SoS
operation. The emerging field of System of Systems Engineer-
ing (SoSE) requires continued growth to evolve, extending
its approach beyond a single system framework towards a
class of complex systems whose constituents are themselves
complex [18][24]. Example approaches may include systems,
security and SoSE guides [21][41][42], and other engineering
approaches such as Security Quality Requirements Engineer-
ing (SQUARE) [43], various iterations of the V-Model and
Double-V model for SoSE, or the Wave model for security
engineering [29][44][45]. The Ministry of Defence and De-
partment of Defense Architectural Frameworks DODAF and
MODAF can also provide a means to model, understand,
analyse and specify capabilities, systems, SoS and related
business processes of an enterprise architecture [46].
Engineering for SoSs is driven by stakeholders’ goals and
needs, and involves more stakeholders than typical single-
system focused systems engineering. For example, stakehol-
ders at the system and SoS level, each have their own needs
and objectives, and competing stakeholders’ interests and goals
[39]. Security risks will likely increase where stakeholders
are not always recognised across the SoS, or stakeholders
of individual systems may have little interest, or resist the
SoS demands on their system giving lower priority to the SoS
[47]. Stakeholders and users may have differing perceptions
of different threats or risks; these can be considered with use
of heuristics, biases, mental models and distributed cognition
models [48][49]. Although, where people accurately perceive
security risks, they are more likely to act appropriately [50].
When modelling any system, it is useful to identify what
the systems does, its purpose, mission and goals, and explore
the interactions of different decisions in a security context.
Models can help reflect these socio-technical characteristics
[39]. However, it is also time-consuming and expensive to
maintain model consistency as changes are made [14]. When
modelling SoSs, a combination of top-down and bottom-up
processes can be used within the requirements engineering
approach, but would require modelling of goals in the system
and SoS context [39]. Eventually, it may become impossible to
understand the situation in its entirety [51], further suggesting
the unlikelihood of a single model successfully capturing
multiple dimensions and perspectives of SoSs [52]. There
is a need for better models visualising how various people
approach a security task, their mental models or security-
related skills and knowledge. Current informal and implicit
models of people are not always robust enough or rarely focus
on how people make security decisions [53]. Moreover, there
is a need to model a level of traceabilty and dependencies
between a systems needs, risk and security requirements across
the SoS as a whole [54].
Determining threats, potential areas of weakness and mo-
delling of such instances may incorporate threat model tools
e.g. [55][56][57], supported by other standard approaches for
risk assessment and requirements. Various activities can also
be mapped with use and misuse cases to provide a source of
security requirements [58][59] that could be further combined
with data-flow diagrams (DFDs) to address security concerns
and risk relating to the process, storage and transmission of
SoS data. Other sources of security requirements may be
visualised through use of UML approaches, such as the Sys-
tems Modeling Language (SysML), Secure Tropos, UMLSec
and SecureUML [60][61][62]. The Goal-oriented Requirement
Language (GRL) models could be used towards considering
interoperability in SoSs to examine the impact of changing
system assets, goals, or user processes [63] or conflicting
security and regulatory requirements [64]. Goal modelling can
also be interlinked with obstacles as a form of threat modelling
to visualise where threat obstacles create a risk of the goal
not being achieved, usually resulting in a negative impact
[65]. Although this approach could be used to derive early
requirements and expectations [66], it could also be aligned
when modelling risk assessment data.
There are a range of modelling tools or approaches, but limi-
ted tool-support integrating some of these different modelling
elements to visualise and assess the security consequences in
greater detail. As many current tools are used or designed in
a single system context, identifying and integrating combina-
tions of tool elements to suitably visualise these elements in a
SoS context becomes the research challenge across indepen-
dent and interdependent socio-technical system interactions of
a SoS. The open-source Computer Aided Integration of Re-
quirements and Information Security (CAIRIS) requirements
management tool [67] already integrates a number of these
elements and models. CAIRIS and its automatic analysis and
visualisation capabilities can assist when modelling the socio-
technical interaction of the SoS and the usability, security, and
requirements engineering activities. This provides a view on
security risks and associated assets, roles, goals, tasks, and ot-
her security and usability concepts [65]. To test the feasibility
of using CAIRIS to assist the risk assessment process, CAIRIS
was introduced into work discussed in Section V.
V. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Towards RQ1
RQ1 was primarily addressed through literature reviews,
then supported by a case-study and related interviews to iden-
tify contributing factors and potential challenges for assessing
security risk assessment of SoSs. Characterising a SoS is
an important step, however each SoS can be quite different,
therefore appreciating these differences and challenges that
emerge will be of consideration. Given the evident differences
and complexities of SoSs, we tested a process for eliciting,
modelling and characterising a SoS using a candidate case-
study as an Acknowledged SoS – The Afghan Mission Network
(AMN). Further details of this work can be found in [1]. By
considering the structure, management, and participation of sy-
stems and stakeholders within the SoS, this contribution helped
to identify relevant human factor implementation and opera-
tional considerations, and where dependencies, constraints, or
conflicting security requirements may exist towards the SoS
achieving its SoS mission goals.
The approach for defining and characterising a SoS was
recently extended further to ground the SoS concept, defini-
tion and description, acting as a baseline for future research
undertaken. A method was proposed to simply describe the
systems and SoS context, as research has found stakeholders
are unclear of the SoS term or concept. The characterisation
process was adapted to consider and define all main types of
SoS, helping us to ask important high-level questions within
the process to determine some of the scale and complexities
of the SoS that can translate into the security risk and require-
ments process. Further details of this work can be found in [3].
This was tested in more recent work with a SoS exemplar of
a Military medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and is discussed
further in pending publications also addressing RQ2 and RQ3.
B. Towards RQ2 and RQ3
Although RQ2 and RQ3 aim to achieve different objectives,
we have come to find the two have symmetry and ultimately
align. Findings from RQ1 and the AMN gave direction towards
SoS challenges that provided the identification of important
concepts to be considered within a framework for SoS security
risk assessment. To explore concepts suitable to support a fra-
mework for SoS security risk assessment integrating modelling
with tool-support, we implemented a SoS case-study – The
SmartPowerchair. We tested three SoS concepts to identify
how they can be considered within the security risk assessment
of the SoS and their effect. Using this output with other SoS
information, this provided an opportunity to integrate the use
of tool-support, testing the feasibility of CAIRIS to model
the SoS and its human interactions to identify and address
challenges to security risk and requirements within the SoS.
Further details of this work can be found in [2].
Current work combines progress and findings from all RQs
and case-studies by first defining a SoS as described in [3],
then implementing a reduced-scale exemplar of a Military
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) SoS case-study using an
enhanced version of OCTAVE Allegro (OA) with certain SoS
elements to assess security risk. Output from OA can then be
modelled using tool-support from CAIRIS, testing different
means and model combinations to reflect human and system
interactions leading to security risk in the SoS from which
mitigations and requirements can be deduced. This provides
further alignment of RQ2 and RQ3 giving direction to future
work. Details of this work will be discussed in pending or
future publications.
VI. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS
Over the forty or more years to present day since the idea
of SoS was conceived, SoSs have changed considerably. Work
addressing RQ1 in particular found the term System of Systems
can be used inconsistently, usually resulting from differences
in scale, complexity, organisational and geographical bounda-
ries, or the number of system interconnections of the SoS.
Boundaries crossover many domains, such as land, sea, air,
space and cyber, networks, the physical or electronic realms,
cultural, organisational or geographical and environmental.
These are all constrained by changing trust equations, and
legal and regulatory requirements, creating different challenges
for SoS security risk and requirements. For example, we
identified the likelihood of unknown or unavailable risk-based
information in which to base risk assessment on in some SoS
types. Therefore, understanding what the minimum level of
information is required to make a satisfactory security risk
assessment is of importance, certainly when translating these
into security requirements for the systems and SoS.
Addressing all RQs, our case-study work has considered the
diversity of small and large-scale SoS examples in the present
day, each with very different context, scale and complex-
ity, governance, management and control. However, to help
reduce unaccounted security risk and mitigating controls or
requirements, system interconnections and stakeholder needs
of the SoS need to be understood. Therefore, providing further
alignment with RQ2 and RQ3, we have tested an approach
using the modified OA for SoS with CAIRIS, for which we
refer to as OASoSIS that aims to provide a repeatable process
assisting the security risk and requirements process.
The OASoSIS approach will continue to be refined using
MEDEVAC, then later implemented and tested as part of the
SQUARE [43] method for the risk assessment of Step 5, whilst
capturing information for Steps 1-4. CAIRIS will continue
as tool-support to elicit, model, and visualise security risks,
producing security requirements as an output. The more refi-
ned process will then be tested with an operational healthcare
SoS or other related case-studies and subsequent publications
to further validate our approach. This aims to identify the
alignment of SoS factors and concepts suitable for eliciting,
analysing, validating SoS security risks and requirements using
tool-support, supporting decision making for the SoS and
Security Requirements Engineering communities.
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